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ABSTRACT 
In Greece a mass movement known as the Aganaktismeni (the 
Indignant) became the main agent of social resistance to the 
memorandum signed by the Greek government, the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund. The Greek movement did not take 
the form of a social movement sharing a minimum collective identity. 
Left-wing protestors played a prominent role. Protestors embracing 
right-wing populist frames also participated actively in collective 
mobilizations, while segments of the extreme right attempted to 
manipulate rage to their advantage. This unique feature of the Greek 
movement posed a completely different challenge to the principles of 
diversity and inclusiveness than the one debated within the Spanish 
Indignados and the Occupy protests. Furthermore, it illustrates that rage 
and indignation may spark dissimilar, even conflicting forms of political 
contention.  
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Rage and Protest: The case of the Greek 
Indignant movement 
 
1. Introduction 
In Greece, a mass movement known as the Aganaktismeni (the 
Indignant) became the main agent of social resistance to the 
memorandum signed by the Greek government, the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund.1 It succeeded in transforming 
public squares into the primary locus of political mobilization across the 
country. The Greek movement shared many attributes with the Spanish 
Indignados and the Occupy movements across the U.S.A. In all three 
cases protestors mobilized against official political institutions, 
challenged financial capitalism, espoused the principle of solidarity and, 
finally, established encampments in public spaces, demanding change 
and experimenting with direct democracy. However, these various 
mobilizations cannot be subsumed into one single category, since there 
were significant variations in regard to political priorities, expressions of 
protest, the presence of collective identities, the prevailing frames and 
finally the trajectory of collective mobilizations.2  Accordingly, the Greek 
movement, unlike the other cases, did not take the form of a social 
movement sharing a minimum collective identity. Left-wing protestors 
played a prominent role. Protestors embracing right-wing populist 
frames also participated actively in collective mobilizations, while 
                                                 
1
 The name ‘Aganaktismeni’ was coined by the Greek media. Since the term implies that the Greek 
mobilizations were merely copies of the Spanish Indignados’ mobilizations, alternative names have 
also been used, such as ‘the piazza movement’, ‘the outraged’, ‘the infuriated’, ‘the Square 
Movement’. See Leontidou (2012), Theodossopoulos (2013), Marangudakis, Rontos, Xenitidou (2013).  
2
 Occupy protests across the United States sparked a debate, whether they were long-term social 
movements or short-lived protests. According to Craig Calhoun these protests were rather moments 
than movements. See Calhoun (2013). 
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segments of the extreme right attempted to manipulate rage to their 
advantage. This unique feature of the Greek movement posed a 
completely different challenge to the principles of diversity and 
inclusiveness than the one debated within the Spanish Indignados and 
the Occupy movements. Furthermore, it illustrates that rage and 
indignation may spark dissimilar, even conflicting, forms of political 
contention.  
The Greek movement took place amid a global economic crisis and the 
proliferation of Occupy protests around the world. This article focuses 
on the national context, highlighting the domestic factors that have 
influenced the current wave of political contention in Greece. An 
account of the time sequence of major protest events before and during 
the Greek movement follows. Next the distinctive features of the 
movement are further elaborated.  
2. The Greek Indignant movement 
 The 2008 financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
found the Greek economy struggling with a huge and mounting public 
debt and deficit. In the parliamentary elections of 4 October 2009, the 
socialist party (PASOK) won power. By April 2010 the country had lost 
market access. On 23 April the prime minister announced the 
government’s request of a financial bailout from the EU and the IMF in 
order to avoid an official declaration of default. A memorandum was 
agreed between the so-called “troika” of foreign lenders (the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary 
Fund) and the Greek government, on a series of economic and financial 
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policies, including short-term objectives as well as long-term structural 
reforms. The Greek government’s implementation of the memorandum 
has been monitored on a regular basis by troika representatives. 
Whenever the set objectives have not been met, the Greek government 
has announced new austerity packages, since meeting the terms of the 
foreign lenders has been a precondition for securing the next installment 
by the troika. Thus, following the initial memorandum, the Greek 
government has repeatedly announced new austerity measures. 
The first mobilizations against austerity policies took place in February 
2010. Throughout 2010 multiple strikes in the public and private sectors 
and mass rallies took place across Greece. The high level of participation 
and the broad geographical spread of collective mobilizations were 
remarkable. Protest events in 2010 revealed some new elements in 
comparison to previous episodes of mobilization (Psimitis, 2011). The 
heterogeneity of the protestors’ social, economic and political identities 
was unprecedented. Protestors expressed their anger not only at 
government’s austerity policies, but also at official political institutions. 
Slogans appeared portraying the Parliament as the personification of a 
corrupt and bankrupt political system (e.g. ‘Burn, burn this brothel, the 
Parliament’ became a popular slogan). Furthermore, in the mobilizations 
of 2010, isolated incidents of aggressive actions were recorded (e.g. 
during the demonstrations a former Speaker of the Greek Parliament as 
well as the president of  the General Confederation of Greek Workers 
(GSEE) were physically attacked).Verbal and physical attacks on 
politicians subsequently became a recurrent pattern. Finally, new 
collectivities (such as citizens’ initiatives, new grassroots associations in 
conflict with the two established confederations GSEE and ADEDY, the 
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movement ‘I Won’t Pay’) became actively involved, staging multiple 
protest events. Even though rallies in 2010 manifested a shift in the 
political culture of contention, they still reproduced traditional political 
divisions. Thus the rallies were spatially fragmented into three diverse 
blocks: the two main trade-union confederations, the leftwing party 
Syriza and the extra-parliamentary Left, and the Greek Communist Party. 
This fragmentation, which was highly criticized by many protestors, 
would later be overcome, when public squares became the primary sites 
of political mobilization, leading to the fusion of diverse political forces.3 
In November 2010 the government unveiled the final draft of the 
following year’s budget. According to the finance minister, the 
government’s goal was to narrow the budget gap by 5 billion euros to 17 
billion euros in 2011, or 7.4% of GDP (SETimes.com, 2010). The 
continuous announcement by the government of new draconian 
austerity measures, despite its promises that the country would quickly 
recover from the crisis, the further contraction of the economy, the 
sharp rise in unemployment and the rise in public debt increased fears 
within Greek society that the country was caught in a vicious cycle of 
debt and recession. Thus, the initial perception of the economic crisis as 
a limited transitional phase that would finally lead to the normalization 
of economic and social life was completely negated. The ongoing 
austerity policies affected not only the working class, but also the 
middle-income strata. Wages and pensions across the public and private 
sector were slashed, while at the same time taxes were raised and new 
taxes were introduced. The government’s spending cuts led also to the 
                                                 
3
 The major trade unions joined the mobilizations. The Greek Communist Party, on the other hand, 
continued to stage protest events separately from the collective mobilizations in the squares. 
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abrupt dismantling of the welfare state. Thus in 2011 the rapid 
disintegration of the social fabric became visible. A new generation of 
homeless poor appeared on the urban landscape (Kaika, 2012). The 
provision of free meals grew to meet rising social needs.4 This collective 
experience of society’s rapid disintegration intensified existing emotions 
of anger and rage. Hence in 2010 a significant cognitive and emotional 
shift took place in Greek society, affecting the goals and tactics of 
subsequent collective protest. Accordingly, mobilizations in 2011 
escalated, becoming more confrontational than those of 2010. 
Within this context, the first endeavor to occupy Syntagma Square (the 
capital’s central square) took place on 23 February 2011. Forceful police 
action and the limited number of participants rendered the attempt 
unsuccessful. On 15 May 2011, the Spanish Indignados occupied the 
squares Puerta del Sol in Madrid and Plaça de Catalunya in Barcelona. In 
late May 2011 multiple calls-outs appeared in social media (especially on 
Facebook) calling on people to protest peacefully, without holding any 
party flags or banners, on 25 May 2011. The calls-out appeared following 
Greek media stories that Spanish protestors in Plaza del Sol held banners 
with the sarcastic slogan “Silence or we will awaken the Greeks!” (Korizi, 
Vradis, 2012, p. 237).5 The calls were highly successful. On 25 May 
people protested in central squares in over 38 cities across Greece 
(“Συνοπτικό Χρονικό”, 2012).6 In Athens, following a massive rally, a 
group of protestors decided to remain in Syntagma Square overnight, 
occupying the square. Participants in the occupation of Syntagma Square 
                                                 
4
 In Athens and Thessaloniki (the second biggest city in Greece) 20.000 people received free meals in 
2011. See Ritzaleou (2011).  
5
 These stories proved to be false (Συνοπτικό Χρονικό, 2012). 
6
 The earlier multiple episodes of protest contributed to the effective mobilization. 
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took inspiration from the Arab Spring (especially the sustained 
occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo) and the Spanish Indignados 
Movement. This initial occupation of Syntagma Square turned into a 
long-term encampment that played a leading role in collective 
mobilizations all over Greece.  
Occupation is not a new tactic in the Greek repertoire of contentious 
politics. Occupation of private and public buildings (e.g. ministries, 
universities, factories, schools, town-halls and highways) has been a 
common practice in multiple episodes of protest. Squatting also 
proliferated following the riots of December 2008.7 Still, the 
encampment of Syntagma Square was an innovative political strategy, 
since protestors took full advantage of the symbolism and location of 
the specific space. In contemporary Greek political history, Syntagma 
Square (Constitution Square) symbolizes the struggle for democracy, 
since in 1843 Syntagma Square was the locus of mass mobilizations 
against King Otto, leading to the establishment of a Greek constitution 
(Madden, Vradis, 2012). Moreover, the long-term encampment in the 
capital’s central square provided an open space where citizens from all 
over the city could assemble. The strategic location of Syntagma Square 
directly opposite the Greek Parliament intensified the symbolic 
challenge that collective protest posed to political decisions taken within 
the Parliament building, while at the same time the image of the 
Parliament provided a specific and tangible target for protestors in the 
square. Furthermore, the occupation provided “a center” and a “more 
                                                 
7
 Prior to the occupation of Syntagma Square, a long-term encampment in central Athens was carried 
out by Afghan migrants, demanding their right to political asylum. They went on a prolonged hunger 
strike, while some of the strikers sewed their lips together to emphasize their determination. 
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cohesive identity” for the diverse political forces that mobilized 
(Calhoun, 2013, pp. 29-30).  
On Friday 27 May the first popular assembly took place in Syntagma 
Square. It passed a resolution calling on citizens to fight for direct 
democracy and the principles of ‘Equality-Justice-Dignity’. The resolution 
defined the goals of the movement as follows: “…We will not leave the 
squares until those who brought us here, go away: Governments, Troika, 
Banks, Memoranda and all those who exploit us. We send them the 
message that the debt is not ours. DIRECT DEMOCRACY NOW! EQUALITY 
– JUSTICE- DIGNITY” (Συνοπτικό Χρονικό, 2011, p. 280). As the resolution 
illustrates, protestors distanced themselves from the Spanish 
Indignados’ call for ‘Real Democracy Now’. Instead, protestors called for 
‘Direct Democracy Now’, emphasizing thereby that their claims were 
incompatible with the official institutions of representative democracy 
(Gourgouris, 2011). On 29 May, the day of the first pan-European appeal 
by Indignados, people gathered and protested in 55 cities across Greece. 
The number of people participating in the encampment in Syntagma 
Square multiplied. Working groups were formed and assemblies on 
specific subjects (e.g. unemployment, education, economic crisis) were 
established. On 31 May, the popular assembly included in its proposals 
the establishment of organizational links between protestors in the 
‘upper’ and ‘lower’ levels of Syntagma Square (Συνοπτικό Χρονικό, 
2011). This proposal addressed one of the distinctive elements of the 
Greek movement, which was the coexistence of conflicting political 
forces, united by their common opposition to the memorandum and 
official political institutions.  
  8 
The Greek Square Movement was not a representative case of a social 
movement sharing a minimum collective identity. According to Taylor 
and Whittier, collective identity refers to a shared definition of a group, 
founded on members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity 
(Taylor and Whittier, 1992). Thus, a “sense of we-ness…is an essential 
component of collective identity” (Owens, Robinson, Smith-Lovin, 2010, 
p.490). This “we-ness” may derive from identities, preceding collective 
protest or identities constructed “in and through” collective protest 
(Polletta, Jasper, 2001, p.285). In the Greek Square Movement, even 
though protestors shared a common opposition to the memorandum, 
they did not always identify positively with each other because of their 
conflicting norms and values. Hence incompatible narratives often 
prevailed among the diverse group of demonstrators. This became more 
apparent in Syntagma Square, where ideological divisions also took the 
form of a spatial divide. Syntagma Square is not a single physical space, 
since it consists of two separate squares on two different levels (the 
‘upper’ and the ‘lower’ level). These two levels are connected by a flight 
of stairs. Thus, the stairs became an invisible dividing line between the 
activists at the top of the square and the ones at the bottom. During the 
day demonstrators usually passed through both squares, thereby 
merging the two squares.8 Following, however, the first month of 
mobilizations demonstrators in each square assumed more uniform 
attributes, leading to two quite distinct blocs. In the upper square, 
protestors expressed mainly feelings of rage “with rough tactics of 
anger” (Leontidou, 2012, p. 306). Thus in the upper square the dominant 
method of protest took the form of collective verbal abuse of the 
                                                 
8
 The term Square movement in regard to collective mobilizations at Syntagma Square refers to 
protestors in both squares. 
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Parliament and the political parties (Sotirakopoulos, 2011). For this bloc 
it was not simply an issue of social injustice. It was primarily an issue of 
national treason and the necessity of imposing punishment (e.g. slogans 
like Traitors/Sell-outs, the country will never die, Traitors, Traitors! 
Justice, Justice!, Take the traitors to Goudi (meaning execute the traitors) 
were written on banners and chanted (Συνθήματα, 2011, Tsaliki, 2012, 
Fragoudaki, 2013). Demonstrators protested holding Greek flags, while 
portraying foreign lenders, Parliament, parties and politicians as 
dangerous forces that had led to the humiliation of the Greek nation. 
Since all politicians were portrayed as corrupt or traitors, anti-political 
populism prevailed in this bloc. This anti-political populism merged with 
strong nationalism and “culturally defensive themes” (Tsatsanis, 2011, p. 
15). References were made to the glorious past of the Greek nation (e.g. 
flyers and posters recalled the heroes of the Greek war of independence 
against the Ottoman Empire in 1821, Sotirakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, 
2013). Furthermore, protestors’ demands for direct, unmediated forms 
of popular sovereignty (such as referenda) often expressed their belief in 
the unified will of the Greek ‘people’. For protestors this homogeneous 
body would render any genuinely representative government strong 
enough to defend the national interests and restore the country’s lost 
pride. Thus claims for genuine democracy entailed often demands for a 
stronger and more effective state. The presence of strong nationalistic 
and populist frames in the upper square transformed the square into a 
public space occupied exclusively by Greek protestors. Even though the 
majority of demonstrators identified themselves as democrats 
protesting about the current crisis of representation and searching for 
alternative models of democracy (Georgiadou, Kafe, Nezi, Pieridis, 2013), 
  10 
the prevailing narratives constructed a political space that enabled the 
intrusion of extreme-right political forces.  
The encampment dominated the lower square.9 Protestors 
experimented with direct democracy, adopting horizontal decision-
making and holding open popular assemblies. Protestors used 
cosmopolitan terminology, underlining the significance of international 
solidarity. Social media were extensively used to coordinate 
mobilizations with protestors in Tunisia, Egypt, and Spain.10 Activists in 
the lower square had generally had experience in the global justice 
movement, the anti-war movement and the World Social Forum. There 
was general agreement among activists on the non-violent identity of 
the movement and the need to safeguard this identity. Protestors 
wished to demonstrate that collective self-rule is feasible.11 Two political 
parties of the Left played a prominent role in the lower square. These 
were the leftwing party Syriza and the extra-parliamentary leftwing 
party Antarsya. Both parties functioned at that time as umbrella 
organizations, consisting of multiple and diverse political organizations. 
Other political groups on the extra-parliamentary left and the anti-
authoritarian/anarchist spectrum also engaged actively in mobilizations 
in the ‘lower square’ (Rokamadour, 2011/2013). In the lower square 
divisions stemming from long-standing ideological conflicts within the 
                                                 
9
 In the Greek Square Movement, as in other Occupy protests, there was an ‘inner’ (e.g. core activists) 
and an ‘outer’ movement (e.g. occasional demonstrators participating in collective mobilizations). The 
identities of the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ movements often diverged, but the encampment provided the 
space where the two movements actually merged (Gitlin, 2013). 
10
 Social media were also extensively used to co-ordinate mobilizations and slogans across Greece. For 
the role of political communication in the Greek Square movement 
see Panagiotopoulou (forthcoming). 
11
 On 28 and 29 June 2011 violent clashes took place among small groups of protestors and the police. 
These events were denounced by many participants in the Square movement and generated friction 
between the demonstrators and the anarchist spectrum. See BBC News (2011), Greece protest against 
austerity package turns violent, 28 June, (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
13935400 - accessed on 20/12/2013). 
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left-spectrum (e.g. ‘reformers’ vs. ‘radicals’) came to the foreground.12 
Some activists prioritized bringing down the government and prompting 
national elections while others aimed to consolidate a strong anti-
capitalist, anti-systemic movement (Makridis, Pagiatsos, 2011). Similarly, 
divisions were recorded in regard to Greece’s participation in the 
Eurozone or the EU. The international/national dimension of collective 
mobilizations was another element, generating friction. Some political 
forces in the lower square embraced the notion of ‘nationalism’ as the 
only means of resisting the implementation of policies decided at the 
European level. Accordingly, many demonstrators were fighting to 
regain democratic control over decisions taken at the national level. In 
the Greek Square movement as a whole, the aspiration of creating ‘a 
European political space’ in which to contest austerity policies remained 
secondary. National frames and narratives predominated in the 
mobilizations, marginalizing the prospect of a Europe-wide challenge of 
neoliberal policies (Pianta, 2013, p. 155). Contention retreated to the 
national level, even though there was extensive networking between 
activists in occupy protests.13  
By contrast with those in Syntagma Square, similarly incompatible blocs 
in other piazzas across Greece shared the same physical space. Even 
though divisions were clear, there was no direct confrontation (Stavrou, 
2011, Leontidou, 2012).  
Mobilizations multiplied during June. Participation was impressive, 
revealing the government’s increasing loss of political legitimacy.  
                                                 
12
 For similar divisions within the Portuguese mobilizations since 2011 see Baumgarten (2013). 
13
 One of the main findings in the research conducted by Mary Kaldor, Sabine Selchow, Sean Deel, 
Tamsin Murray Leach was that Europe was “… ‘invisible’ in current public displays of subterranean 
politics.” (Kaldor, Selchow, Deel, Murray-Leach, 2012, p. 18).  
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Expectations in regard to the political potential of the movement rose. 
The largest protest took place in Syntagma Square on 5 June. 
Approximately half a million demonstrators took part. More than 10,000 
demonstrators participated in the popular assembly (Συνοπτικό Χρονικό, 
2011). The internet was used to communicate directly with the popular 
assembly in Puerta del Sol in Madrid. Massive protests took place also in 
cities all over Greece. On 15 June, the day of a general strike, protestors 
tried to encircle the Parliament. Police responded with excessive 
violence and indiscriminate use of tear gas and flash grenades. The 
mobilizations that had the strongest influence on the future trajectory of 
the movement were those on the 28 and 29 June. On those two days a 
new package of austerity measures (the Mid-Term Memorandum) was 
to be presented to Parliament for ratification. The labor unions called for 
a national strike on both days. Activists in the movement decided to 
surround the Parliament, prevent deputies from entering and put strong 
pressure on deputies within the Parliament to vote against the new 
measures. Participation in these mobilizations exceeded initial 
expectations. Most demonstrators were convinced that deputies would 
be reluctant to vote in favor of the austerity measures due to the 
sustained episodes of popular protest and large-scale mobilizations. 
However, the measures were ratified and the police responded to the 
collective mobilizations with extreme violence. They brutally beat 
demonstrators, journalists, passers-by and patients at the first-aid 
station in Syntagma Square. Amnesty International condemned the 
police violence (Amnesty International, 2011). Demonstrators chanted 
“it is a junta, it will end”. Protest continued throughout the following 
weeks, but participation gradually declined. The ratification of the new 
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austerity measures shattered many protestors’ belief in the political 
potential of the movement. As Claus Offe underlines: “In order to 
become active in the public sphere you need … a reasonable certainty 
that there is some agency ‘out there’ that will actually ‘listen’ to, be 
attentive to, and be able to make a difference in response to what you 
have to say, even in the presence of powerful opponents to the point of 
view you wish to communicate. In other words, you need a measure of 
basic confidence in the responsiveness of democratic institutions, such 
as parties, parliaments, and governments.” (Offe, 2009, pp. 12-13). Sissi 
Korizi reflecting on her participation in the movement argues: “I went to 
the square with the conviction that after a few days of protest our 
government, or at least the other parliamentary parties, would listen to 
popular indignation. That they would respect our demands, our right to 
equality, dignity, work.” (Korizi, Vradis, 2012, p. 241). The majority of 
demonstrators took an extremely negative view of representative 
democracy as a practical political project. However, they continued to 
take a positive view of representative democracy as a model of 
constitutional government. Hence protestors questioned the legitimacy 
of existing political institutions, but did not withdraw their consent from 
representative democracy.14  As one militant activist vividly expressed it: 
“Our big illusion was that we believed that we had suddenly persuaded 
hundreds of thousands of people to reject democracy that they were 
ready to go to the “next step” […]. They [the protesters] cursed the 
politicians, all politicians indiscriminately, yet they remained in front of 
the parliament all day, as if they were expecting something from their 
representatives. Their claim was addressed exactly to the people they 
                                                 
14
 For the distinction between legitimacy and consent see Burawoy (1989). 
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were shouting against. This we did not see at that point.” (Sergi, 
Vogiatzoglou, 2013, p. 232).  
On 3 July a resolution by the popular assembly posed two central 
questions: “What do we do now?” and “How do we do it?” (Συνοπτικό 
Χρονικό, 2011, p. 297). Disappointment and self-reflection was also 
evident in subsequent resolutions passed by the popular assemblies. On 
30 July the police dismantled the encampment. Mobilizations continued 
throughout September and October, taking the traditional form of 
strikes and demonstrations as well as the occupation of public buildings. 
However the 2012 protests were smaller, less vociferous and more 
sector-fragmented, even though the scale of unemployment and 
economic deprivation increased sharply. After the Square movement, 
the protestors’ belief in the political efficacy of collective protest had 
weakened, undermining any further endeavor to unite diverse political 
forces. On the other hand, grassroots activism was strengthened. 
Protestors ceased to expect that change would come from above and 
became actively involved in multiple regional and local social solidarity 
networks.15 Furthermore, the Greek Square movement had a strong 
impact on the existing party system. It set in motion political changes 
that altered the established political landscape.   
In late October 2011 Prime Minister George Papandreou announced that 
Greece would hold a referendum on the EU bailout agreement for the 
country. This unexpected declaration triggered a fierce reaction from the 
                                                 
15
 Ishkanian, Glasius, and Ali state in their research that “In Athens, after Syntagma Square, there has 
been emphasis on solidarity economy including food parcels, social pharmacies, electricity 
reconnection, direct selling by farmers to consumers, community self-help centers, etc. One of the 
slogans of the solidarity movement in Greece is “No One Alone in the Crisis””. See Ishkanian, Glasius 
and Ali (2013), p. 10. 
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European Union and Greek oppositional parties as well as from 
members of the socialist party. Moreover, it led to widespread public 
outrage in Greek society. Since all previous decisions had been taken 
behind closed doors, consistently ignoring lasting, large-scale protests, 
the sudden referendum plan was perceived as a strategic move by 
George Papandreou to regain political legitimacy and avoid calling early 
elections. In November 2011, Prime Minister George Papandreou 
resigned following the formation of an interim three-party coalition 
government, which consisted of PASOK (socialist party), New Democracy 
(conservative party) and the LAOS (far right party).16 The two national 
elections that followed in May and June 2012 brought radical changes, 
leading to the collapse of the traditional two-party system. In its place a 
polarized multi-party system emerged. In both elections New Democracy 
won a majority with a small lead over Syriza (18.85% of the vote in May 
2012 and 29.66% in June 2012). Syriza, which had gained 4.59% in the 
national elections of 2009, consolidated its position as the main 
opposition party (winning 16.79% of the vote in May 2012 and 26.89% in 
June 2012). The former governing party (PASOK) was the main loser of 
the elections (winning 13.18% of the vote in May 2012 and 12, 28% in 
June 2012). The new parties Democratic Left (centre-left), the 
Independent Greeks (right-wing populist) as well as the neo-Nazi party 
Golden Dawn all entered Parliament.17 The far right LAOS which had 
                                                 
16  LAOS (People’s Orthodox Rally) was founded in 2000 by a former legislator of the conservative 
party (George Karatzaferis). The party “…has championed the radical right-wing principle of “national 
priority”” (Georgiadou, 2013, p. 83) and has called for “…the protection of the Nation, the Genus, the 
Faith” and the expulsion of illegal immigrants (Ellinas, 2013, p. 4). The party gradually softened its 
extreme positions. The participation of LAOS in the interim coalition government and the sudden rise 
of the Golden Dawn led to the former party’s demise. In the elections of 2012 LAOS failed to get any 
seats in Parliament.   
17
  The neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn was founded in 1983, but remained inactive for many years. It 
became active in the early 90s during Greece’s dispute with the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia over the latter’s name. Golden Dawn supports National Socialism and speaks in the name 
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participated in the interim coalition government failed to elect any 
representatives. 
3. Socio-political Profile of Protestors 
The grievances that mobilized diverse groups and individuals included 
anger with the government’s austerity policies, foreign lenders, banks, 
political parties, economic elites, corruption and increasing inequalities, 
Hence, in the case of the Greek movement, as in the other Occupy 
protests around the world, neo-liberalism and the power of global 
financial capital, the prescription of national policies by international 
organisations (e.g. the EU, the IMF), the crisis in political representation 
and finally corruption were major causes of protest. Participants in 
collective mobilizations were a combination of experienced political 
activists and people participating in street politics for the first time. 
Protestors belonged to a broad range of social strata, age groups and 
political affiliations. It is almost impossible to categorize the socio-
political composition of the Greek movement, since it continued to 
evolve throughout its course. Thus social surveys provide a crucial 
insight but do not capture the complete picture of collective 
mobilizations. According to a poll conducted during collective protest in 
Syntagma Square in June 2011,  23.8% of protestors were private 
employees, 14.6% were pensioners, 13.7% were public servants, 13.7% 
were unemployed, 13.2% were self-employed and 12.9% were university 
                                                                                                                                            
of the biological superiority of the Greek race. The party also openly endorses the country’s 1967-1974 
military dictatorship (Ellinas, 2013, Georgiadou, 2013).  Golden Dawn has been involved in hundreds 
of violent attacks against immigrants, left-wing activists, Roma and homosexuals. The party has taken 
a stand against the bailout agreement. In September 2013 a young anti-fascist musician, Pavlos Fyssas, 
was stabbed to death by a Golden Dawn supporter. In late September the leader of Golden Dawn and 
party officials were arrested on charges of forming a criminal organization. In late December 2013 
opinion polls still put the party in third place behind the conservative party New Democracy and left-
wing opposition party Syriza.  
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students (Chiotis, 2011). An academic project co-coordinated by Vasiliki 
Georgiadou found that most participants held bachelor's degrees (60%), 
while a small minority had a post-graduate degree (8%). The majority of 
protestors were aged 25-44 (25.3%) and 35-49 (27.4%) (Kollia, 2012). At 
the national level, the social profile of protestors differed in some 
respects from the profile of protestors in Syntagma Square (e.g. older 
age cohorts and protestors with secondary education were more 
numerous at the national level).18 As for to the political profile of 
protestors, 43% of left-aligned and 36% of right-aligned citizens 
participated in the Square Movement across Greece. In addition, 38% of 
those who described themselves as having ‘no ideology’ engaged in 
collective mobilizations (Public Issue, 2011).  
In conclusion, collective mobilizations in Syntagma Square represented a 
broad social and inter-generational alliance. This alliance was firmly 
grounded in material conditions, since austerity measures affected the 
greater part of Greek society. The heterogeneous social and political 
composition of the Square movement influenced the movement’s 
narrative to a certain extent (e.g. class-discourse remained marginal 
within the Greek movement, despite the sharp rise of class polarization 
in Greek society).19 In the Greek case, as in other Occupy protests, a 
collective subject (e.g. the Indignant) was constituted. This collective 
subject was primarily the outcome of collective mobilization and 
prevailing narratives. 
                                                 
18
 In contrast with the December 2008 events, young people were not the political protagonists of the 
Square Movement. The participation of immigrants was also more limited in comparison to December 
2008. 
19
 The national elections of June 2012 were marked by an exceptionally high level of class polarization. 
See Η Εποχή online (2012) Συνέντευξη με τον Ηλία Νικολακόπουλο: Όλοι περιμένουν να έρθει 
κυβέρνηση της Αριστεράς, 5 November, (available at http://www.epohi.gr/portal/politiki/11256-2012-
11-05-03-14-55 - accessed on 20 20/12/2013).
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4.  Square Encampment - Direct Democracy  
During the Greek movement the largest mass experiment in direct 
democracy took place in Syntagma’s lower square. In the lower square, 
multiple working groups were established to support and sustain 
collective mobilizations (e.g. a nursery, a food and beverage rationing 
group, a media group, a cleaning team, an artistic team). The working 
groups operated horizontally according to the principles of grassroots 
democracy. Open discussions about the state of the economy and the 
possibility of alternative economic policies were held, enabling citizens 
to voice their opinion and concerns. Thus the traditional divide between 
technocrats and citizens was challenged. This participatory ethos also 
guided the proceedings of the popular assemblies, the main decision-
making body of the movement. Every evening at 21:00 a popular 
assembly was held (Tsaliki, 2012). The selection of speakers was random. 
Numbers were allocated randomly to participants and lots were drawn 
to determine the order of speakers on the podium (Leontidou, 2012). 
Every day, approximately a hundred people expressed their opinions. 
The encampment, however, was not simply a free enclave, where the 
existing order could be contested and participatory democracy enacted. 
Activists in the encampment looked beyond the occupied square 
towards achieving a broader transformation of social relations. 
Therefore links were established with other actors (e.g. neighborhood 
assemblies) to further mobilizations and contestation.  
The encampment constructed an alternative public realm in which 
people interacted, debated, got informed and expressed feelings. As well 
as articulating opinions, the participants shared their feelings of anger, 
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confusion and anxiety. Social interaction among strangers was a 
common pattern. Since in the Greek context problems like poverty, 
unemployment and private debt were experienced by numerous and 
diverse social groups, they were openly discussed and debated. Thus 
individual experiences were stripped of any moralistic discourse, 
individual deficiency or failure and were transformed into shared social 
experience. Moreover, impoverished individuals living on the margin of 
society or belonging to the underclass (e.g. drug addicts) found an open 
space to engage with broader collectivities or to voice their concerns. 
Syntagma Square provided a space of solidarity within a society 
overwhelmed at times by feelings of anxiety, rage and aggressive 
reactions.20 
Nevertheless, the Greek Square movement differed from the Indignados 
and Occupy movements in regard to inclusiveness. In the latter two 
movements, political activism was coupled with an aspiration to create 
spaces open to diversity. Both movements acknowledged the existence 
of multiple counterpublics within the broader movement.21 They 
encouraged, therefore, the articulation of counter-discourses by 
participants with different identities and interests (Asen, 2000). For 
instance, the 15M Movement in Spain persistently focused attention on 
developing structures and tactics that would give voice to the excluded 
(Hughes, 2011). Likewise, Occupy Boston addressed the issue of under-
representation of people from poor, working class communities and of 
                                                 
20
 Athanasia Chalari in her research on social change and agency in current Greek society recorded that 
the “… main themes emerging from the interviews in relation to how Greeks perceive Greek society 
involve uncertainty, disappointment, pessimism, insecurity, fear, anger, negativism, pressure, anxiety 
and depression.” (Chalari, 2012, p. 18).  
21
 The acknowledgement of diversity is linked to the political experience of new social movements, the 
alter-globalization movement and the social forums.    
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color.22 In the Greek context the open character of the piazza movement 
should not be overestimated. Syntagma Square was a site of 
confrontation within a highly polarized society.23 Demonstrators did not 
simply voice their opposition to austerity policies. They struggled to 
bring down the government and repeal the memorandum. For 
protestors, the movement’s outcome would determine their personal 
lives and the country’s future. Hence, priority was given to immediate 
political confrontation with the government. Moreover, the 15-M 
movement’s strict codes to ensure civility were incompatible with the 
polarization of Greek society and public rage against elected politicians 
(Baiocchi, Ganuza, 2012). In the Greek context, heterogeneity of 
opinions existed in popular assemblies, but only in regard to issues 
debated within the anti-memorandum bloc (e.g. to stay in or leave the 
euro zone). People who were ambivalent about the memorandum 
would not find an open space to debate. Individuals who had links with 
the conservative or socialist party were not welcome (Tsaliki, 2012).  
Social movements draw symbolic boundaries, identifying who is (“us”) 
and is not (“them”) a member of the movement (Owens, Robinson, 
Smith-Lovin, 2010). Social movements also identify opponents. The 
development of an oppositional identity is a vital precondition for 
collective action (Morris, 1999, Kern, 2013).  However, the distinctive 
element in the case of the Greek movement was that its boundaries 
were rigid and flexible at the same time. They were rigid in regard to 
                                                 
22
 An anti-oppression workshop was established and the strategy of extensive networking with groups 
outside Occupy Boston (community-based groups or groups of the traditionally marginalized) was 
adopted (Juris et. al, 2012). 
23
 Sunstein argues that there are “two different accounts of group polarization. One account suggests 
that polarization reveals hidden beliefs and desires. A very different account insists that polarization 
creates new beliefs and desires.” (Sunstein, 2009, p. 30). 
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political forces that supported or did not actively oppose the 
Memorandum, while they were flexible in regard to other ideological 
opponents (e.g. forces of the populist right and staunch nationalists). 
Thus, in the Greek context opposition to the memorandum and lack of 
any affiliation to official political institutions became the dominant 
dividing line, defining opponents and protestors’ stand vis-à-vis other 
protestors. This remarkable coexistence of oppositional political forces 
would not have been possible without significant prior shifts in Greek 
political culture, which illustrate rigorous questioning of post-1974 
representative democracy and the rise of new political cleavages in the 
Greek party system. 
5. Post-junta democracy in question/ Political Cleavages    
Many activists in the Square movement had ambivalent attitudes 
towards the past and its political legacy.24 This was evident in regard to 
the Polytechneio uprising and the subsequent post-junta period. Since 
the restoration of democracy in 1974, the students’ uprising against the 
junta at the National Technical University of Athens (Polytechneio) in 
1973 has been one of the most prominent political symbols of popular 
struggles for democracy. In the Greek Square movement, protestors 
accused the existing political regime of being a phony democracy, 
violating citizens’ rights. Thus protestors’ slogans linked the Square 
movement to the Polytechneio uprising. A popular slogan was “Bread, 
Education, Liberty: The junta did not end in 1973”.25 The slogan 
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 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the events in December 2008 and the historical 
past see Kornetis (2010). 
25
 The slogan “Bread, Education, Liberty” was a prominent slogan in the Polytechneio uprising. The 
junta did not end in 1973, as the slogan of the Greek Square movement claims, but in 1974. 
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emphasizes historical continuity (between the Polytechneio uprising and 
the Square movement) in order to motivate citizens to reclaim 
democracy and citizenship in contemporary Greek society. However, it 
dismisses the whole post-junta era, which has been the longest period of 
democratic stability in Greece’s modern history.26 In the narratives of 
the Square movement ‘democracy’ was often a reference detached from 
any actual historical experience. Being detached from history and 
claimed by conflicting political forces, ‘democracy’ gradually became a 
floating signifier.    
The shift in political attitudes towards the recent past reflects 
widespread anger with the two party system of the post-junta era. It 
also reflects broader changes in Greek political culture. Since the fall of 
the junta there has been exclusive two-party control of the government 
(by New Democracy or PASOK), due to the prevailing left-right cleavage. 
However, in the May and June 2012 national elections the influence of 
the traditional left-right cleavage subsided, while a new cleavage 
emerged between pro-Memorandum and anti-Memorandum political 
forces.27 This new cleavage cut across the left-right cleavage, leading to a 
process of massive re-alignment (e.g. the right-wing populist 
Independent Greeks took a clear stand against the Memorandum. On the 
other hand, the centre-left Democratic Left party, even though critical of 
the Memorandum, participated in the subsequent pro-Memorandum 
coalition government). The Square movement both incorporated and 
reinforced the political changes that were subsequently recorded in the 
                                                 
26
 According to Mazower: “Greeks must not turn their back on the democratic legacy of the post-1974 
era…People need to defend the achievement of the metapolitefsi”. See ekathimerini.com (2013), 
Mazower warns Greece is underestimating threat of Golden Dawn, 13 February, (available at 
www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite3_1_13/02/2013_482908 - accessed on 20/12/2013). 
27
 There were further divisions within the anti-Memorandum bloc. 
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electoral results of May and June 2012. The movement comprised a 
plurality of diverse political groups belonging to the anti-Memorandum 
bloc. At the same time, the complex and sometimes contradictory 
influence of the two cleavages was evident in the participation of 
ideologically opposed political forces in the Square movement.  
6. The extreme right  
The ongoing economic crisis and the devastating social impact of the 
austerity policies (including poverty, unemployment, urban decay, 
shrinking social services, and the rising incidence of suicide) have been 
the strongest factors feeding the rise of the extreme right. Other 
contributing factors have been the rise of authoritarian elements in the 
political regime (e.g. the weakening of parliamentary procedures and 
escalation of police violence and surveillance) and the gradual 
legitimation of the extreme right by a growing section of the party 
system and the mass media.28 However, to understand the broad appeal 
of extreme-right frames in Greek society today, one must take into 
account not only existing problems in Greek society, but also pre-existing 
elements in Greek political culture. Since cultures encompass diverse 
and often conflicting elements, political actors select specific elements 
of a society’s cultural repertoire (Zhao, 2010). The extreme right has 
merged elements such as the post-civil war perception of the Left as an 
internal enemy that must be eliminated (today the extreme right 
portrays immigrants as the primary internal enemy), the deep distrust of 
                                                 
28
 For instance, the interim three-party coalition government that was formed in November 2011, 
included the extreme right party LAOS.  
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the West, anti-Semitism and nationalism with racism, anti-
parliamentarism and authoritarianism.29  
The extreme right perceived widespread public disaffection with 
representative democracy and political parties as a crucial opportunity 
to penetrate civil society by presenting itself as the only genuine anti-
establishment force. Since the fall of the junta, several extreme-right 
political parties have participated in Greek national elections. Initially, 
these extreme-right groupings gave voice to traditional monarchists and 
supporters of the junta (Georgiadou, 2013). In the early 90s, however, 
the extreme right undertook a process of ideological renewal. It adjusted 
its agenda to contemporary challenges and embraced nationalism as the 
defining element of its ideology. The fight against what it termed illegal 
immigration became another prominent element of its agenda (Ellinas, 
2013). 
During the first days of collective mobilizations extreme-right groups 
tried to stage protests under their own banners in the upper square. This 
led to the reaction of left-wing activists, who expelled them from the 
square. Subsequently, there was no organized presence of extreme-right 
groups in the upper square. Still, the majority of extreme right political 
forces tried to capitalize on widespread public anger with the 
government, austerity policies and political parties. Like other 
countermovements, the extreme right adopted elements of the tactics 
and rhetoric of the political forces it opposed. 30 The extreme right 
                                                 
29
 For the post-civil war perception of the Left as an internal enemy and the extreme right’s 
contemporary portrayal of immigrants see Christopoulos (2013), Pantazopoulos (2012).  
30
 For instance in the U.S.A. white supremacists have appropriated slogans from the civil rights 
movement and have transformed them into demands for equal rights for whites. See Blee, Creasap 
(2010). 
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resorted to direct action (e.g. every night the TV channel extra-3 called 
on listeners to join mobilizations in Syntagma Square, banners that 
appeared in Greek squares against global governance reproduced the 
extreme right’s arguments that there is a global conspiracy involving 
bankers, political elites, Jews and masons to impose new secret forms of 
global governance). The extreme right also incorporated elements of the 
left-wing discourse on political dissent. The extreme-right blog ‘Social 
Insurrection’ (Koinoniki Exegersi) is a representative case. It cites Noam 
Chomsky, but at the same time it accuses politicians of national treason, 
demands their immediate punishment, adopts conspiracy theories and 
proposes the shutting down of all parties.31  
Some extreme-right political forces distanced themselves from collective 
mobilizations. As the extreme right makes extensive use of social media 
to communicate its positions to the public, its blogs provide evidence of 
its internal divisions. For instance, the Hellas-Orthodoxy blog, 
responding to criticism by ‘patriots’, who were participating in the 
Square movement, issued a statement accusing the movement of 
promoting ‘global governance’.32 Likewise the hellasxg blog accused the 
Square movement of staging a fake conflict.33 The blog ‘Free Greeks’ 
(Eleftheri Ellines), on the other hand, acknowledges that ‘the movement’ 
(e.g. extreme-right political forces) does not have a unified stand on 
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 Verbal abuse of the Left dominates in all extreme-right blogs. See 
www.koinonikieksegersi.blogspot.com/ 
32
 www.hellas-orthodoxy.blogspot (2011) ΕΞΕΓΕΡΘΕΙΤΕ,ΑΓΑΝΑΚΤΗΣΤΕ!ΕΓΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΨΤΕ ΤΑ 
ΕΘΝΙΚΑ ΣΥΝΟΡΑ ΓΙΑ ΜΙΑ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑ ΔΙΑΚΥΒΕΡΝΗΣΗ",ΛΕΕΙ Ο ΣΤΕΦΑΝ 
ΕΣΕΛ,ΙΔΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ ΗΓΕΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ "ΑΓΑΝΑΚΤΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ"!, available at 
http://hellas-orthodoxy.blogspot.gr/2011/05/blog-post_1935.html - accessed on 20/12/2013). 
33
 www.hellasxg.blogspot (2011) Αγανακτισμένοι Σχιζο-φρενείς Από Μια Στάλα!!!!! Είμαι ψυχή και 
σώμα στο εμείς! Και αν διαβάζουμε τέτοια άρθρα θα βγούμε νικητές, 17 July (available at 
www.hellasxg.blogspot.com/2011/07/blog-post_9355.html - accessed on 20/12/2013). 
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collective mobilizations in the Greek squares.34 Still, even those elements 
of the extreme right that denounced the mobilizations took advantage 
of public anger to promote their agenda (e.g. the blog hellasxg covered 
all verbal or physical attacks on politicians).35 
7. ‘The Indignant’: Emotions and Cognition     
The espousal of reactionary populist frames by many protestors in the 
upper square did not alarm all left-wing activists in the lower square. 
Many saw active engagement in collective mobilizations as the most 
important catalyst in raising and radicalizing political consciousness. 
Thus they treated prevailing frames in the upper square as the 
spontaneous, naïve expressions of individuals who had been secluded 
for years in their own private sphere and were, therefore, incapable of 
translating their rage into a political discourse.36 Accordingly, they often 
viewed demonstrators in the upper square as having been devoid of any 
political identity prior to their active engagement in collective 
mobilizations. However, demonstrators in the upper square were not 
simply ‘the Indignant’ lacking any political identity. They were not blank 
slates upon which new identities could be inscribed. Emotions of rage 
and indignation include cognitive and moral appraisal of the social order. 
Protestors in both squares were motivated to join collective 
mobilizations by their moral outrage. They shared an injustice frame that 
labelled the acts of political authorities as unjust. However, the 
                                                 
34
 www.eleftheroiellines.blogspot.com (2011) «ΑΓΑΝΑΚΤΙΣΜΕΝΟΙ» ΚΑΙ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ???, 
28 May (available at www.eleftheroiellines.blogspot.com/2011/05/blog-post_8443.html -  accessed on 
20/12/2013). During collective mobilizations in Syntagma Square extreme-right activists were 
observed co-operating with the police. Vradelis S. (2011) Στην επιφάνεια οι σχέσεις «στοργής» ΕΛ.ΑΣ. 
– Χρυσής Αυγής. Ξύπνησε μνήμες η προνομιακή μεταχείριση των πέντε κουκολοφόρων, 07 February, Τα 
Νέα (available at http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4639406 – accessed on 20/12/2013). 
35
 See www.hellasxg.blogspot.com/ 
36
 See the analyses by Stavrou (2011), Sergi and Vogiatzoglou (2013). 
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normative priorities and value predispositions of participants were 
different. Thus passionate indignation was generated by cognitive 
evaluations concerning the violation of different moral values and 
principles. Accordingly, accusations of ‘national treason’ prevailed in the 
upper square, while accusations of ‘social injustice’ were predominant in 
the lower square. The protestors’ different normative priorities led also 
to the adoption of diverse diagnostic frames in regard to the causes of 
the injustice and the actors responsible for it. In the populist frames in 
the upper square, the causes were attributed primarily to the political 
establishment. In the lower square, on the other hand, the causes were 
less personified, since they were linked to a systemic crisis. Thus rage 
and indignation were tied to different diagnostic frames and 
consequently to different claims. In brief, elements of the protestors’ 
identity prior to mobilization were embedded in the frames they 
adopted and the claims they articulated while mobilizing. The 
protestors’ emotions of rage were not independent of their ideological 
positioning. During the Greek Square movement frames and 
oppositional frames competed in moulding the movement’s collective 
identity. Even though no overall collective identity preceded the 
collective mobilizations or was constructed through collective protest, 
there were strong partial (collective) identities in both squares.  
Another significant factor motivating citizens to join collective 
mobilization was the collective perception of ‘interdependency in risk’ 
(Turner, 1996, p. 6). According to Turner, when the experience of risk is 
intensified, due to changing objective conditions or the subjective 
redefinitions of an existing situation, then a shared perception of 
‘interdependency in risk’ emerges (e.g. “the misdeeds of a few can have 
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profound effects on my well-being”, Turner, 1996, p.12). This altered 
experience of risk initiates efforts to overcome an extremely negative 
situation by controlling the behavior of the few, who are depicted as 
responsible. In the Greek Square movement, the level of risk was 
perceived as unacceptable and unjust. Strong belief in the 
‘interdependency in risk’ provided a crucial solidarity function in 
promoting collective action.   
8. “Democracy out of Rage”?    
The context in which the Greek movement emerged was favourable for 
social movement mobilization. The Greek movement succeeded in 
transforming the occupied squares into the primary sites of political 
contestation across the country. It may have not succeeded in its 
immediate goals, but it has had long-term political and personal 
consequences. Even after the Syntagma Square encampment ended, its 
impact was profound.  
The Greek Square Movement was the outcome of significant cognitive 
and emotional shifts that took place in Greek society. The political 
consequences of these shifts became apparent when citizens publicly 
expressed their indignation in the Greek squares. The multiple 
expressions of rage and indignation in the Greek movement manifested 
the diverse, often conflicting, political identities of the protestors. This 
underlying conflict was not played out at that time. However, if it had 
been played out, it would have revealed that the interplay of emotional 
rage and political contention is no way straightforward. Advances in 
democratization and inclusive citizenship are only one of the possible 
outcomes of this complex interplay. 
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